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Measuring and Bounding Experimenter Demand
By Jonathan de Quidt, Johannes Haushofer, and Christopher Roth⇤
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We propose a technique for assessing robustness to demand e↵ects
of findings from experiments and surveys. The core idea is that
by deliberately inducing demand in a structured way we can bound
its influence. We present a model in which participants respond to
their beliefs about the researcher’s objectives. Bounds are obtained
by manipulating those beliefs with “demand treatments.” We apply
the method to eleven classic tasks, and estimate bounds averaging
0.13 standard deviations, suggesting that typical demand e↵ects
are probably modest. We also show how to compute demand-robust
treatment e↵ects and how to structurally estimate the model.
JEL: B41, C91, C92
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A basic concern in experimental work with human participants is that, knowing
that they are being experimented on, the participants may change their behavior.
Specifically, participants may try to infer the experimenter’s objective from their
treatment, and then act accordingly (Orne, 1962; Rosenthal, 1966; Zizzo, 2010).
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For instance, participants who believe the researcher wants to show that peo-
ple free-ride in public good games might play more selfishly than they otherwise
would. Thus, instead of measuring the participant’s “natural” choice, the data
are biased by an unobservable experimenter demand e↵ect. Demand e↵ects pose
a threat to external validity, because participants would make di↵erent choices if
the experimenter were absent. They can a↵ect estimates of average behavior and
treatment e↵ects, and have been raised as a concern in the context of lab experi-
ments (List et al., 2004; List, 2006; Levitt and List, 2007), field experiments (All-
cott and Taubinsky, 2015; Dupas and Miguel, 2017; Al-Ubaydli et al., 2017), and
survey responses (Clark and Schober, 1992; Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2001).1
The core idea of our paper is that one can construct plausible bounds on
demand-free behavior and treatment e↵ects by deliberately inducing experimenter
demand and measuring its influence. For example, in a dictator game, we explic-
itly tell some participants that we expect they will give more than they normally
would, while others are told we expect they will give less. Under the assumption
that any underlying demand e↵ect is less extreme than our manipulations (in
a sense that we will formalize), choices under these instructions give upper and
lower bounds on demand-free behavior, and by combining bounds from di↵erent
experimental treatments we can estimate bounds on treatment e↵ects.
We begin with a simple Bayesian model of decision-making that motivates our
approach. In our model, an experiment defines a mapping from actions to util-
ity. The experimenter is only interested in measuring the “natural” action (or
changes in that action) that maximizes the participant’s utility as derived from
the experimental payo↵s. However, the participant is also motivated to take ac-
tions that conform to the experimenter’s research objectives. He infers those
objectives from the design features, and distorts his action, biasing the results.
Our demand treatments manipulate those beliefs to identify an interval contain-
ing the natural action. We remain agnostic about why the participant wishes to
please the experimenter; motives could include altruism, a desire to conform, a
1Zizzo (2010) discusses how demand e↵ects can arise from di↵erent sources, such as perceived social
pressure from the experimenter, or inferences about appropriate behavior. In psychology, experimenter
demand e↵ects are considered a specific case of “demand characteristics” (Orne, 1962), which also include
the simple e↵ect of being observed (“Hawthorne” e↵ects), or the e↵ect of features of the environment on
task construal. Researchers might also worry about “social desirability bias” (respondents taking actions
they perceive to be moral or desirable, which may or may not relate to the researcher’s objectives), or
responses motivated by respondents’ own preferences over the findings (e.g. respondents might misreport
income in a survey to increase their eligibility for a program). In this paper we focus on inferences about
the experimenter’s objective, but the framework can easily be adapted to fit other inferences.
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misguided attempt to contribute to science, or an expectation of reciprocity from
the experimenter.
We provide an extensive set of applications of the method. We conduct seven
online experiments with approximately 19,000 participants in total, in which we
construct bounds on demand-free behavior for 11 canonical tasks.2 We employ
two di↵erent types of demand treatments. “Weak” demand treatments signal
an experimental hypothesis to our respondents: we tell them “We expect that
participants who are shown these instructions will [work, invest, ...] more/less
than they normally would.” We believe that these treatments are likely to be
more informative than implicit signals about demand in typical studies, so in our
view these bounds will be su cient for most applications. Our “strong” demand
treatments go further, telling participants “You will do us a favor if you [work,
invest, ...] more/less than you normally would.”3 These give rise to much more
conservative bounds, which may be useful for applications where concerns about
demand are paramount. They also play an important role in our more structural
applications, described below, and their strength makes them suited for studying
demand e↵ects in their own right.
We establish several novel facts about demand e↵ects. Our first finding is that
responses to the weak treatments are modest, averaging around 0.13 standard de-
viations, varying from close to zero for unincentivized real e↵ort to 0.29 standard
deviations for trust game second movers. In most tasks, our estimates are not
significantly di↵erent from zero. Overall, we interpret these results as suggesting
that demand e↵ects in typical experiments are likely to be small. Responses to
our strong demand treatments are much larger, with bounds averaging 0.6 stan-
dard deviations and ranging from 0.23 to 1.06 standard deviations. While these
bounds are likely more conservative than required in most applications, they il-
lustrate that participants can respond substantially to strong signals about the
researcher’s objective, thus researchers are right to pay close attention to potential
demand e↵ects in their studies.
2Specifically, we study simple time, risk and ambiguity preference elicitation tasks, a real e↵ort task
with and without performance incentives, a lying game, dictator game, ultimatum game (first and second
mover), and trust game (first and second mover).
3We based this phrasing on Binmore, Shaked and Sutton’s (1985) experiment on the ultimatum
game, in which the instructions included the line “You will be doing us a favour if you simply set out
to maximize your winnings.” These instructions were subsequently criticized precisely because they
potentially induce experimenter demand (see e.g. Zizzo, 2010). In recent work, Ellingsen, O¨stling and
Wengstro¨m (2018) use similar language, deliberately using demand to try to shut down social preference
motivations in games with communication.
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The heterogeneity across tasks in responsiveness to our treatments reveals dif-
fering levels of uncertainty about the importance of experimenter demand in
di↵erent tasks. For example, there is more uncertainty (i.e., wider bounds) about
demand e↵ects for trust game second movers than in the e↵ort task. We provide
an additional assumption, “monotone sensitivity,” under which this heterogeneity
can be interpreted as revealing variation in the magnitude of demand e↵ects in
di↵erent tasks, i.e. that demand e↵ects are larger for trust game second movers.
Next, we apply the method to bounding treatment e↵ect estimates, deriving
bounds on the real e↵ort response to performance pay. The bounds we obtain
using our weak demand treatments are quite tight, corresponding to around 11
percent of the estimated treatment e↵ect (or 0.07 standard deviations). The
strong demand treatments generate wider bounds, but even these more conser-
vative bounds exclude zero, supporting the qualitative finding that incentives
increase e↵ort. We apply standard methods to construct “demand-robust” confi-
dence intervals on the bounds and on the underlying actions or treatment e↵ects
contained by those bounds. These intervals combine the standard parameter un-
certainty due to sampling error with the additional uncertainty due to potential
demand e↵ects.
Third, we turn to point estimation of treatment e↵ects. We ask whether apply-
ing same-signed demand treatments to both the control and treatment group (for
example, demanding high e↵ort from both groups) can reduce or eliminate bias
due to experimenter demand. Intuitively, the goal is to “control for” demand by
harmonizing beliefs across treatments. We show that this approach is valid under
additional assumptions, and apply it to the e↵ort experiment, obtaining a set of
alternative estimates, all lying within 10 percent of the conventional treatment
e↵ect estimate.
Fourth, following the basic approach of DellaVigna and Pope (2018), we illus-
trate how su ciently informative demand treatments can be used in conjunction
with a structural model to obtain unconfounded estimates of structural param-
eters of interest and measure participants’ value of conforming to the experi-
menter’s wishes. We estimate that the value of pleasing the experimenter in our
e↵ort task is equivalent to increasing the monetary incentives by 20 percent.
Fifth, we explore some of the properties of demand e↵ects. Our approach re-
lies on a Monotonicity assumption, essentially assuming that participants want to
comply with rather than defy the researchers’s wishes. We find strong support for
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this assumption in average behavior, and at the individual level, using a within-
participants design. We show using simple belief data that participants’ beliefs
about the experimental objective respond as expected to our demand treatment.
We also compare our bounds to estimates of the e↵ect of double anonymity in
dictator games, one manipulation that has been interpreted as reducing demand.
Finally, we examine four moderators of sensitivity to experimenter demand: in-
centivized versus hypothetical choice; gender; attention; and participant pool.
Finally, we provide an extended summary of recommendations for practitioners,
covering how to apply the methods developed and practical lessons learned from
our own applications.
We contribute to the small literature discussing experimenter demand e↵ects
(Zizzo, 2010; Fleming and Zizzo, 2014; Shmaya and Yariv, 2016), demand charac-
teristics (Orne, 1962), and obedience to the experimenter (Milgram, 1963). We are
aware of few attempts to directly assess the empirical importance of experimenter
demand, and a key contribution of our paper is to provide a general framework
for studying demand e↵ects and evidence from a wide range of standard tasks.
In recent work, concurrent with our own, Mummolo and Peterson (2017) conduct
two vignette studies on support for free speech and partisan news consumption,
and a hypothetical audit study concerning racial bias in hiring, using treatments
similar to our weak demand treatments.4 While they do not construct bounds,
they find modest responses to these treatments, in line with our findings.5
Relatedly, our paper contributes to the literature on social pressure (DellaVigna,
List and Malmendier, 2012; DellaVigna et al., 2017) and moral suasion (Dal Bo´
and Dal Bo´, 2014).
We also relate to the literature which examines the e↵ects of anonymity on
4For example, some participants in the audit study are told “We expect that job candidates with
names indicating they are white will be more likely to receive an interview because of the historical
advantages this group has had on the job market,” while others are told “We expect that job candidates
with names indicating they are African American will be more likely to receive an interview because
corporations are increasingly looking to diversify their workforces.”
5Other related papers include Cilliers, Dube and Siddiqi (2015), who show that a white foreigner’s
presence in the lab in experiments in Sierra Leone distorted giving in dictator games; Lambdin and
Sha↵er (2009), who find that participants’ ability to guess hypotheses varied (but was mostly low) across
three di↵erent experimental tasks; Bischo↵ and Frank (2011), in which an actor (unsuccessfully) tried to
induce demand e↵ects by their delivery of instructions in a lab game; and Tsutsui and Zizzo (2014) who
measure individual demand sensitivity by participants’ propensity to select dominated lotteries from a
list when told “it would be nice if some of you were to choose” them. List (2007) and Bardsley (2008)
argue that behavior in the dictator game is to a large degree an artifact of the experimental situation.
Small, Loewenstein and Slovic (2007) assess the robustness of the “identifiable victim e↵ect” to di↵erent
question framings and find that the e↵ect disappears once the experimenter informs respondents about
the e↵ect.
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behavior in the laboratory. Participants who believe their choices are being mon-
itored might be more likely to try to please the experimenter. Ho↵man et al.
(1994) and List et al. (2004) find that varying anonymity can influence pro-social
behavior, while Barmettler, Fehr and Zehnder (2012) find little e↵ect. Intrigu-
ingly, Loewenstein (1999) suggests that participants’ responses to the anonymity
treatments in Ho↵man et al. (1994) could themselves be driven by demand. Our
findings also complement work that explores the principal-agent relationship be-
tween experimenter and participant (Chassang, Padro´ i Miquel and Snowberg,
2012; Shmaya and Yariv, 2016).
Finally, our paper relates to the debate on how lab behavior generalizes to the
field (Harrison and List, 2004; List, 2006; Levitt and List, 2007; Falk and Heck-
man, 2009; Camerer, 2012; Kessler and Vesterlund, 2015). There are multiple
reasons why behavior might di↵er between lab and field, including demand ef-
fects. Our focus is on bounding the influence of demand while holding constant
other design features. In some cases there may exist a “natural field experi-
ment” counterpart to the design of interest, in which participants are unaware
of the experiment, addressing demand alongside other external validity concerns.
However, the set of studies that can be practically conducted as natural field
experiments is limited. This literature often highlights a distinction between
qualitative (directional) and quantitative e↵ects. Either could be threatened by
experimenter demand. Our approach can be used to put quantitative bounds
on point estimates, but also to assess whether a qualitative finding could be ex-
plained by a demand e↵ect, for instance by asking whether the bounds exclude
zero or a sign reversal.
One indication of the level of concern about demand is the consideration given
to it in study design. The experimental toolbox contains a number of techniques
that are partly or wholly motivated by the goal of reducing the influence of exper-
imenter demand. For example, researchers often work hard to conceal potential
signals about the study objective (such as e↵orts to avoid making gender salient,
Bordalo et al., 2016); favor between-participant designs despite the larger samples
required (Charness, Gneezy and Kuhn, 2012);6 or conduct costly natural field ex-
6Charness, Gneezy and Kuhn (2012) write (p2), “Within designs may lead to spurious e↵ects, through
respondents expecting to act in accord with some pattern, or attempting to provide answers to satisfy
their perceptions of the experimenter’s expectations... Demand e↵ects are likely to be stronger in a
within design.”
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periments (Harrison and List, 2004).7 These approaches plausibly make it more
di cult for participants to infer the true experimental hypothesis – hopefully re-
ducing the correlation between inference and treatment – or reduce participants’
responsiveness to their inferences. But it is di cult to be sure that one has been
successful, or that participants are not acting out some other conjecture that could
be correlated in unpredictable ways with treatment. It is also di cult to know
what is the set of studies that remains unpublished, or not even conducted, due
to unresolved concerns about demand. Our bounding approach seeks to isolate
the hidden demand e↵ects by amplifying them with an explicit demand e↵ect. It
can be applied broadly without requiring major changes to experimental design,
and we believe it will prove a useful addition to the toolbox.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section I presents a simple model of experi-
menter demand. Section II describes the experiments. Section III presents bounds
on natural actions and treatment e↵ects, demand-corrected point estimates, and
structural estimates. Section IV examines properties of demand e↵ects and the
assumptions underlying our approach. Section V provides guidance for applying
our approach in di↵erent settings. Section VI concludes. A set of web appendices
contains theoretical details and additional results.
I. Theory
We now derive a simple model of experimenter demand and demand treatments.
We begin with the three central assumptions at the heart of our approach, and
provide a Bayesian model that generates them. Next we discuss demand treat-
ment design. We conclude with a brief discussion of heterogeneity, and defiers,
participants who do the opposite of the experimenter’s wishes. Web appendices
B.B5 and B.B6 extend the model to allow participants to infer the importance of
the experimenter’s objective, and to model demand treatments that ask partici-
pants to ignore the experimenter’s objective.
We model a decision-maker (he) who has preferences over outcomes induced
by his action a 2 R in an experiment. a could be continuous or discrete, but
for simplicity we focus on the case of continuous actions with a natural ordering
(more/less e↵ort, investment, giving).
7Other design features include abstract framing of choices, anonymized responses, homogenized deliv-
ery of instructions and incentivized choice. Review articles by Zizzo (2010) and de Quidt, Vesterlund and
Wilson (2018) provide a discussion, de Quidt, Vesterlund and Wilson (2018) also measure their adoption
in published experimental papers.
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In the absence of demand e↵ects, the optimal action is simply a function of
the decision-making environment. We index environments by ⇣ 2 Z, where
⇣ captures aspects including participant characteristics (e.g. male/female, stu-
dent/representative sample), setting (e.g. lab/field, online/in-person), experi-
mental treatments, the content and framing of information provided to partici-
pants, and so on. A key component of ⇣ is information the participant has about
other treatments (e.g. in a within-participant design), which might inform their
beliefs about the experimental objective.
Given ⇣, we define the “natural” action a(⇣) as that which would be taken ab-
sent any confounding motive for pleasing the experimenter.8 The experimenter
(she) is interested in measuring a specific action a(⇣) (e.g., the level of giving
out of an endowment), or a treatment e↵ect a(⇣1)   a(⇣0) (e.g., the e↵ect of
incentives on e↵ort provision). Unfortunately, her task is complicated by experi-
menter demand. After observing ⇣, the decision-maker forms a conjecture about
the experimenter’s wishes or objectives, which may change his action. Instead of
a(⇣), he chooses action aL(⇣), where L signifies the presence of a “latent”, unob-
served experimenter demand influence. The influence could increase or decrease
a: aL(⇣) R a(⇣). We define the latent demand e↵ect in environment ⇣ as the
di↵erence aL(⇣)  a(⇣).
While nonzero latent demand automatically biases estimates of mean actions,
it does not necessarily bias estimates of treatment e↵ects. To see this, note that
the observed treatment e↵ect can be decomposed as follows:
aL(⇣1)  aL(⇣0) = a(⇣1)  a(⇣0)| {z }
E↵ect of interest
+ [aL(⇣1)  a(⇣1)]| {z }
Latent demand in ⇣1
  [aL(⇣0)  a(⇣0)]| {z }
Latent demand in ⇣0
(1)
The first term on the right-hand side is the treatment e↵ect of interest. The
second and third capture the potential bias due to experimenter demand. If both
demand e↵ects are equal they cancel and the treatment e↵ect is identified, but
they may not cancel, either because the participant’s inference or his response to
a given inference varies with ⇣. The usual logic of a randomized experiment is
to ensure that variation in treatment is orthogonal to potential confounds, but
8In some experiments, the experimenter essentially fills the role of a real-world authority figure. For
example part of the real-world response to incentives might include a response to perceived demand from
an employer. For a researcher interested in the total e↵ect of incentives, perceived demand may actually
be part of the environment of interest, ⇣, rather than a confound.
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as demand e↵ects may be driven by the treatment itself, randomization does not
guard against bias.
EXAMPLE 1: Consider two variants on the Dictator game, in which a partici-
pant is told to choose what fraction of $10 to give to a recipient. In variant 0, he
is told that the recipient is aware that the choice is taking place, while in variant
1 they are unaware (for instance, the money will just be added to a show-up fee).
Absent any motive for pleasing the experimenter, the participant would prefer to
give $4, so the true treatment e↵ect is a(⇣1)  a(⇣0) = $0. However, in variant 0
he infers that the experimenter wants him to be generous, so he gives $5, while in
variant 1 he infers that the experimenter wants him to be selfish, so he gives zero.
The experimenter fails to measure true preferences in either case, and identifies
a treatment e↵ect that is in reality a demand e↵ect.
A. Demand treatments
We now assume that the experimenter has at her disposal a particular kind
of treatment manipulation which we call a demand treatment. Negative demand
treatments deliberately signal a demand that the decision-maker decrease his
action, inducing a (⇣), while positive demand treatments demand an increase and
induce a+(⇣). Our first substantive assumption is a basic monotonicity condition:
ASSUMPTION 1 (Monotonicity): a (⇣)  aL(⇣)  a+(⇣).
Assumption 1 requires that demanding an increased action does not decrease it,
and vice versa. It has a natural connection to the monotonicity condition in the
estimation of local average treatment e↵ects (Angrist and Imbens, 1994): the
assumption rules out “defier” behavior whereby participants do the opposite of
what is demanded.
Our main assumption amounts to assuming that the demand treatments can
bound the natural action of interest:
ASSUMPTION 2 (Bounding): a (⇣)  a(⇣)  a+(⇣).
It implies bounds for natural actions (2) and treatment e↵ects (3):
a(⇣) 2 [a (⇣), a+(⇣)](2)
a(⇣1)  a(⇣0) 2 [a (⇣1)  a+(⇣0), a+(⇣1)  a (⇣0)](3)
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For some purposes we may wish to be able to make comparative statements
about demand in di↵erent environments. Although the latent demand e↵ect is
unobservable, the sensitivity of behavior to demand treatments may be informa-
tive about it. First, we define what we mean by “sensitivity.”
DEFINITION 1 (Sensitivity): Sensitivity is the di↵erence in actions under pos-
itive and negative demand treatments: S(⇣) = a+(⇣)  a (⇣).
REMARK 1: In addition to bounding the natural action, assumptions 1 and 2
jointly imply that sensitivity S(⌧) provides an upper bound on the magnitude of
the latent demand e↵ect: S(⇣)     aL(⇣)  a(⇣)  .
This fact enables us to use sensitivity S(⇣) to make statements of comparative
ignorance, in the sense that if S(⇣1) > S(⇣0) there is more scope for large latent
demand e↵ects under ⇣1 than ⇣0. But it could nevertheless be that the true latent
demand e↵ect is larger under ⇣0. Our third assumption, Monotone Sensitivity,
allows us to make concrete claims about magnitudes.
DEFINITION 2 (Comparison classes): A comparison class ZC ✓ Z is a set of
environments such that Monotone Sensitivity holds for all z 2 ZC .
ASSUMPTION 3 (Monotone Sensitivity): S(z) is strictly increasing in  aL(z)  a(z)   for all z 2 ZC .
Monotone Sensitivity permits statements such as “latent demand is stronger for
participant pool A than participant pool B” or “latent demand is stronger under
incentive scheme A than incentive scheme B.” We derive some comparison classes
below using our Bayesian model.
B. Bayesian model
We now provide a simple foundation for our main assumptions, and derive con-
ditions under which they will or will not hold. The environment ⇣ determines the
mapping from actions a 2 R into outcomes or distributions over outcomes. The
decision-maker’s payo↵ is v(a, ⇣), where v captures the payo↵ structure (mapping
from actions to outcomes) and preferences (mapping from outcomes to utility).
We assume v is strictly concave and di↵erentiable, so the natural action a(⇣)
solves v1(a(⇣), ⇣) = 0.
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Latent demand
Demand enters preferences as follows. Upon observing ⇣, the decision-maker
makes an inference about the experimenter’s objective, h 2 { 1, 1}. If h =  1,
he believes the experimenter benefits from him taking low actions, while if h = 1
he believes she benefits from high actions. He has a preference,  , for pleasing
the experimenter, which we allow to depend upon ⇣.9 We remain agnostic about
why the participant wishes to please the experimenter; possible motives include
altruism, a motive to conform, or a belief that he will ultimately be rewarded for
doing so.
We assume utility takes the following separable form:
U(a, ⇣) = v(a, ⇣) + a (⇣)E[h|⇣].(4)
The optimal action aL(⇣) thus solves:
(5) v1(a
L(⇣), ⇣) +  E[h|⇣] = 0
so aL(⇣) = a(⇣),  E[h|⇣] = 0. There is therefore no demand confound if either
the decision-maker assigns equal likelihood to the preferred action being high or
low (E[h|⇣] = 0), or he does not care about the experimenter’s objectives (  = 0)
(these would be expected in a “natural field experiment,” where the participant
is unaware of the experiment). We assume the decision-maker’s mean prior over
h is E[h] = 0, so in the absence of any new information about h he chooses
a(⇣). The relation between actions and beliefs is captured by daL(⇣)/dE[h|⇣] =
  /v11(a, ⇣), which has the same sign as  . Actions are monotone in beliefs.
We model learning as follows. The environment ⇣ includes a signal hL(⇣) 2
{ 1, 1} which the decision-maker believes is a su cient statistic, i.e. E[h|hL(⇣), ⇣] =
E[h|hL(⇣)]. He believes that with probability pL(⇣), the signal is correct (hL = h),
and with probability 1   pL(⇣) it is pure noise (hL = ✏, where ✏ equals  1 or 1
with equal probability). We impose that pL(⇣) 2 [0, 1). It is straightforward to
9We have in mind that   might depend on the identity of the experimenter (e.g. a firm versus
a researcher) or decision-maker (e.g. women might have di↵erent attitudes than men).   might also
vary with other features such as the salience of the benefit to the experimenter, or how important the
participant believes his actions are for achieving the experimenter’s objectives.
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see that:
E[h|hL(⇣)] = hL(⇣)pL(⇣)(6)
The decision-maker’s belief depends on ⇣ in two ways. First, via the sign of hL(⇣),
i.e. whether he believes that the experimenter wants a high or low action, which
determines the direction of the latent demand e↵ect. Second, via pL(⇣), i.e. the
perceived informativeness of the signal, which a↵ects the magnitude of the latent
demand e↵ect.
Demand treatments
We assume that the experimenter can choose a “demand treatment” signal
hT 2 { 1, 1, ;}. hT = ; corresponds to the usual case in which no demand treat-
ment is used, while hT = 1 and hT =  1 correspond to positive and negative
demand treatments. These signals provide information about h so as to direct
the decision-maker’s beliefs. We assume that if hT = ; the decision-maker does
not update his belief about h (for example because their prior is that demand
treatments are never used). This assumption is reasonable as (at present) demand
treatments are rarely used in experiments. We maintain throughout that ⇣ (and
hence v(a, ⇣), hL(⇣), pL(⇣), and  (⇣)) does not depend on the demand treat-
ment, i.e. receiving a demand treatment does not change the decision-maker’s
interpretation of the maintained experimental environment or their motive for
pleasing the experimenter. Instead the demand treatment is interpreted purely
as informative about the direction of the experimenter’s objective.10
The decision-maker believes that hT is informative about h: with probability
pT , hT equals h, and with probability 1   pT it equals ⌘, which takes values -1
and 1 with equal probability. ⌘ and ✏ are believed to be independent (we revisit
this assumption in web Appendix B.B6). The Bayesian posterior is:
E[h|hT , hL(⇣)] = h
L(⇣)pL(⇣) + hT pT
1 + hL(⇣)pL(⇣)hT pT
(7)
10Formally, we assume that ⇣(hT ) = ⇣, 8⇣. This assumption will be stronger for some demand treat-
ments and environments than others, and is an important consideration in the selection of appropriate
demand treatments. If it does not hold then Bounding might fail because the demand treatments alter
the natural action itself: a(⇣(;)) /2 [a(⇣( 1)), a(⇣(1))]. In web Appendix B.B5 we extend the model to
allow   to depend on hT and show that the Bounding condition remains unchanged.
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Thus, if hL(⇣) = hT , the demand treatment reinforces the participant’s belief,
while if the signals have opposite signs they o↵set one another.
Assumptions
We now use the model to provide foundations for our main assumptions de-
scribed in Section I.A. Derivations can be found in web Appendix B.
First, Assumption 1 (Monotonicity) states that a positive demand treatment
increases the action (relative to no demand treatment) and the negative demand
treatment decreases it. It is straightforward to see that except for the trivial case
pT = 0, these conditions are satisfied if and only if     0, i.e. a weak preference
for pleasing the experimenter.
PROPOSITION 1: Monotonicity holds for all pT if and only if     0.
Second, Assumption 2 (Bounding) states that the demand treatments provide
bounds on the true action. In the Bayesian model, given     0 (Monotonicity),
the action is larger or smaller than a(⇣) when  E[h|hT , hL]   0 or  E[h|hT , hL] 
0 respectively. Intuitively, whatever the latent demand e↵ect, the demand treat-
ment that opposes it must be informative enough to reverse the sign of beliefs. It
is clear from inspection of (7) that this simply requires the demand treatments
to be “more informative” than latent demand, pT   pL(⇣).
PROPOSITION 2: Given     0, Bounding holds if and only if pT   pL(⇣).
Finally, Assumption 3 (Monotone Sensitivity) states that within a comparison
class ZC of environments, di↵erences in sensitivity are informative about dif-
ferences in underlying latent demand. Latent demand and sensitivity can vary
for multiple reasons, so there is no simple condition that guarantees when this
assumption will and will not hold. In web Appendix B.B3 we work out some
important cases. First, we show that Monotone Sensitivity holds when variation
in demand e↵ects is driven by di↵erences in the strength of preference for pleasing
the experimenter,  . Second, we analyze Monotone Sensitivity when variation in
demand e↵ects is driven by di↵erences in the payo↵ function, v, deriving spe-
cific conditions when v is additively or multiplicatively separable and providing
examples such as variation in incentives. Third, we show that Monotone Sensi-
tivity holds in a model of inattention to experimenter demand. Finally, we show
that Monotone Sensitivity does not hold in general when environments di↵er in
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the beliefs they induce (E[h|hL(⇣)]). We use these findings when interpreting
heterogeneous responses to demand treatments in section IV.D.
C. “Weak” and “strong” demand treatments
There are many di↵erent ways to signal a desire for high or low actions. How
should the experimenter choose? The model gives us a way to answer this ques-
tion. The width of the bounds [a (⇣), a+(⇣)] is increasing in pT . Therefore the
tightest bounds, subject to satisfying Bounding (pT   pL(⇣)), are obtained when
pT = pL(⇣). In other words, we want the “least informative” demand treatment
possible, subject to being “informative enough” for Bounding.11 We want to
choose demand treatments that are likely to be “stronger” or more informative
than any latent demand in the study of interest, while avoiding excessively strong
signals that lead to uninformative bounds.
In our empirical applications we employ two types of demand treatments, de-
scribed in more detail below. Our “weak” manipulations explicitly signal what
we expect participants to do; we believe these are already more informative than
likely latent demand in typical experiments. Our “strong” manipulations go fur-
ther, telling participants which action will “do us a favor.” These lead to more
conservative bounds, and may be useful for applications where researchers are es-
pecially concerned about demand e↵ects. They also play a role in more structural
applications, described in Sections III.D and III.E.
D. Heterogeneity and Defiers
The approach naturally extends to the case where participants are heteroge-
neous and the experimenter is interested in average behavior or average treatment
e↵ects. If Monotonicity and Bounding hold for all agents individually, then they
also hold for average actions, so we can simply reinterpret a, aL, a+ and a  as
representing average behaviors and our approach remains valid.
An important dimension of heterogeneity is in  , the preference for pleasing the
experimenter. Monotonicity requires a weak positive preference,     0. “Defiers”
with   < 0 prefer to go against the experimenter’s wishes. Bounding fails for these
11This gives a novel reason why deception in experiments can be problematic. If the demand treat-
ment is regarded as uninformative because participants are used to second-guessing what experimenters
are really after, then the bounding exercise is invalidated. We thank an anonymous referee for this
observation.
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individuals, because a  > a+. We show in web Appendix B.B4 that the method
is able to tolerate some defier behavior, but too much will lead to failures of
Bounding. We give an example where Bounding is satisfied provided the average
participant is a complier. In general, for defier behavior to be “small enough” the
joint distribution of preferences and beliefs must be such that that the response
by the compliers outweighs that of the defiers.
II. Sample and experimental design
We conducted seven experiments in total to demonstrate our approach and to
provide estimates of demand sensitivity on a wide range of standard experimental
tasks (to save space, we provide citations for the tasks in web Appendix E). Our
respondents complete one of eleven tasks: a dictator game; a risky investment
game, without or with ambiguity; a convex time budget task; a trust game (first
or second mover); an ultimatum game (first or second mover); a lying game;
and a real e↵ort task with or without performance pay. We conduct all of our
experiments online, primarily because the large number of treatments would be
infeasible to implement in the laboratory. We designed the experiments to maxi-
mize comparability. For all experiments except the e↵ort task, the action spaces
are similar (they can be expressed as real numbers from 0 to 1); we pay the same
show-up fee; recruit from the same participant pools; use the same mode of col-
lection (online); the same response mode (sliders); and keep stakes as similar as
possible.12
We employ two phrasings for our demand treatments. Our “weak” treatments
explicitly tell participants that we expect high or low actions. For example, in the
investment game, participants were told at the end of their instructions that “We
expect that participants who are shown these instructions will invest more/less
in the project than they normally would.”13 The strong treatments go further,
telling participants that they will “do us a favor” by taking a higher or lower
action. For example, in the dictator game, participants in the positive demand
12For the e↵ort task, we replicated the design employed in DellaVigna and Pope (2017) and DellaVigna
and Pope (2018). The primary di↵erences with our other tasks are a higher show-up fee and a di↵erent
response mode (e↵ort).
13It is not completely straightforward to design demand treatments that report the experimental
hypothesis, because if the experimenter truly hypothesizes that the action will be high in one treatment,
telling participants she expects it to be low could be considered deceptive. By referring to “participants
who are shown these instructions” (which include the demand treatment) we avoid this issue, because
it is indeed true that we expect high actions from participants in the positive demand treatment group
and low actions in the negative demand treatment group.
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condition were told “You will do us a favor if you give more/less to the other
participant than you normally would.” We keep the phrasing of the demand
treatments as homogeneous as possible across tasks. In the two-player games we
do not provide information about demand treatments shown to the other player,
but our approach could be extended to create common knowledge about demand.
Table 6 summarizes the design features of each experiment, and Table 7 provides
design details, parameters, and the exact wording of the demand treatments for
each task. Figure A1 gives an example from the experimental interface. Full
experimental instructions can be found on the journal webpage.
A. Participant populations
We conducted six experiments with approximately 16,000 participants (or “work-
ers”) on Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) (Experiments 1–3 and 5–7), and one
experiment with around 3,000 participants using an online panel sample rep-
resentative of the US population in terms of region, age, income, and gender
(Experiment 4). MTurk is an online labor marketplace that is frequently used by
researchers for surveys and experiments. It is attractive because it o↵ers a large
and diverse pool of workers. There is some evidence that MTurk workers are
more attentive to instructions than college students (Hauser and Schwarz, 2016).
To participate in our MTurk experiments, workers had to live in the U.S, have an
overall approval rating of more than 95 percent, and have completed more than
500 tasks on MTurk, fairly standard parameters in research on MTurk.14
Most workers on MTurk are experienced in taking surveys, which might a↵ect
the external validity of our results. We used the representative sample, whose
participants are less experienced with social science experiments, to replicate a
subset of our findings. The sample is maintained by a market research company,
Research Now.
14We excluded prior participants when recruiting for experiments 2 and 3. Technically this is achieved
by applying a “qualification” flag to the MTurk accounts of prior participants, which can then be used to
prevent them seeing or accepting new MTurk tasks posted by us. At the time of running experiments 5
and 6, we had essentially exhausted the active participant pool, and to avoid undue delays in recruitment
we therefore allowed prior participants to take part. Around 36 percent of the respondents in these
experiments had not participated before. In experiment 7, which was conducted some time later, we did
exclude prior participants, but a server communication error meant that not all accounts received the
qualification flag and as a result some prior participants did take part. 70 percent of the respondents
in this experiment had not participated before. Our results are virtually unchanged by the dropping of
participants who completed more than one of our experiments; results are available upon request.
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B. Pre-analysis plans
Our experiments were conducted in a sequence, between May 2016 and May
2017. Each is described in a pre-analysis plan (PAP) posted online prior to
launch.15 The sequence is laid out in Table 6. For each experiment, the PAP
details the data to be collected, treatment variables, experimental instructions,
and how we planned to analyze that experiment’s data.
However, presenting the data experiment-by-experiment is repetitious. There-
fore, for brevity and clarity of exposition, in the paper we pool the data and
analyze all tasks side-by-side for our weak and strong demand treatments sepa-
rately (this structure was described in pre-analysis plan 5). Our main analysis
uses data from MTurk respondents with real stakes, which we have for all eleven
tasks studied. In the analysis of heterogeneity we introduce hypothetical choice
data from MTurk and the representative panel, which were collected for a subset
of tasks. When averaging across tasks we weight observations to give equal weight
to each task.
Other than this pooling across experiments, our analysis closely follows what
was pre-specified.16 For completeness, web Appendix C presents all pre-specified
analyses, experiment-by-experiment. We refer to findings in the text if relevant.
C. Summary statistics
Tables D1 to D7 in the web Appendix present the pre-specified balance tables
for all of the experiments. Tables D8 to D15 provide summary statistics on our
respondents. Table D12 highlights that respondents from the online panel are
representative of the US population by gender, income, age, and region, and
other observables. Attrition was low, below 2 percent on average, and did not
di↵er across demand treatment arms (Tables D16 and D17).
15The pre-analysis plans were posted on the Social Science Registry and can be found here:
https://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/1248.
16In some experiments we proposed to standardize responses based on average choices in the no-
demand condition. Because we did not collect no-demand data for all tasks, for consistency we always
standardize based on the negative demand treatment group (a simple and inconsequential linear trans-
formation). For our real-e↵ort tasks, which were based on DellaVigna and Pope (2018), we pre-specified
that we would apply their exclusion criteria to the analysis dataset (excluding participants that take
more than 30 minutes, take the task more than once, score zero or more than 4,000 points, or have
invalid MTurk IDs). In our other experiments we did not pre-specify exclusions, but for consistency we
also drop participants who submitted multiple responses (less than 0.5 percent). This is inconsequential
for the results.
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III. Applying the method
A. Bounding natural actions
In this section we provide bounds on natural actions estimated using our weak
and strong demand treatments. For a subset of tasks we also measured behavior
with no demand treatment, and describe these results in Section IV.A where
we discuss Monotonicity. Our objects of interest here are mean behavior in the
positive (a+(⇣)) and negative (a (⇣)) demand conditions.
Panel A of Table 1 and Figure 2 show mean actions by task and demand
treatment for incentivized MTurk respondents with weak treatments. Panel B of
Table 1 and Figure 1 display sensitivities (a+(⇣) a (⇣)), in both raw and z-scored
units. Sensitivity is modest, averaging around 0.13 standard deviations, and
frequently not significantly di↵erent from zero. The strongest responses (between
0.2–0.3 standard deviations) were observed for the dictator game, the ultimatum
game second mover, and the trust game second mover. As we have argued, the
weak manipulations seem likely to satisfy bounding for typical applications, so
these results give cause for optimism.
Panel A of Table 2 and Figure 2 show mean actions in the di↵erent demand
treatment arms employing strong treatments. Panel B of Table 2 and Figure 1
display sensitivities. Behavior is responsive to our strong demand treatments,
and sensitivity is significantly di↵erent from zero in all tasks, averaging around
0.6 standard deviations. Sensitivity is particularly high in the dictator game, for
second movers in the trust and ultimatum games, and for unincentivized e↵ort.
These manipulations are significantly stronger than likely implicit signals in most
experiments or surveys, so providing quite conservative upper bounds on typical
demand biases. However, they do demonstrate that participants are motivated
to respond to signals about the researcher’s goals, and that responses can be
significant when those signals are strong. Thus the attention researchers pay to
potential demand e↵ects at the study design stage is well justified.
[Insert Table 1, Table 2, and Figures 1 and 2]
B. Bounding treatment e↵ects
Our real e↵ort experiments replicate treatments from DellaVigna and Pope
(2018). Participants alternately pressed the “a” and “b” keyboard buttons for
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10 minutes, earning one point per pair. One group were told that their score
“will not a↵ect [their] payment,” while a second group received one cent per 100
points. By combining the bounds estimated for each incentive treatment we can
construct bounds on the treatment e↵ect of performance pay on e↵ort provision.17
Table 3 displays the conventional treatment e↵ect (aL(1) aL(0), where “1” and
“0” correspond to the reward per 100 points), the upper bound of the treatment
e↵ect (a+(1)  a (0)), and the lower bound (a (1)  a+(0)). In words, the lower
bound on the treatment e↵ect is given by comparing participants who received
performance pay, coupled with a negative demand treatment, to participants
who received no performance pay, coupled with a positive demand treatment.
We first show the bounds generated using our weak treatments, which are quite
tight, ranging from 0.67 to 0.75 standardized units.18 The width of these bounds
corresponds to only 11 percent of the estimated treatment e↵ect (or 0.07 standard
deviations), suggesting a limited role for experimenter demand in explaining the
e↵ort response to incentives. Naturally, the bounds created using the more con-
servative strong treatments are much wider, ranging from 0.23 to 1.21 standard
deviations. Even these conservative bounds support the qualitative finding that
e↵ort responds to incentives.
[Insert Table 3]
C. Confidence intervals
It is possible to compute confidence intervals for (a) the bounds themselves,
and (b) the parameters contained by those bounds (a natural action or treatment
e↵ect), following Imbens and Manski (2004) (see Appendix B.B7 for details).
The latter can be thought of as “demand-robust” confidence intervals, combin-
ing conventional parameter uncertainty due to sampling error with the additional
17Our pre-analysis plans did not explicitly describe the bounding of treatment e↵ects, but it is an
immediate extension of the approach to bounding actions.
18In constructing the bounds using our weak treatments we note that the average e↵ort in the no-
incentive condition was actually slightly higher for those receiving negative demand than those receiv-
ing positive demand, i.e. we observe a small monotonicity failure (a+(0) < a (0)). When sensitiv-
ity is low, such outcomes can easily arise due to sampling variation; both values here are statisti-
cally indistinguishable. In such cases, the procedure we propose in this section could lead to bounds
on the treatment e↵ect with negative width. A conservative approach, which we follow, is to first
“iron” the bounds on the no-incentive condition, by averaging them. Formally, one can compute
a+iron(⇣) = max{a+(⇣), 0.5[a+(⇣) + a (⇣)]} and a iron(⇣) = min{a (⇣), 0.5[a+(⇣) + a (⇣)]}, and then
use these values when computing the bounds on the treatment e↵ect, which become a+(1)   a iron(0),
and a (1)   a+iron(0). Because in this case a+iron(0) = a iron(0) , the width of the weak bounds on the
treatment e↵ect is simply equal to a+(1)  a (0).
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uncertainty about possible demand e↵ects. Uncertainty due to sampling error
can be reduced in the usual way by increasing sample size (specifically, in the
demand treatment arms), while uncertainty due to demand is reduced by select-
ing minimally informative demand treatments, subject to Bounding (see section
I.C). Table A3 presents confidence intervals computed from individual tasks us-
ing both the weak and strong demand treatments. Table A4 presents confidence
intervals on the bounds and treatment e↵ect of the e↵ect of incentive pay in the ef-
fort experiment. Zero lies outside these confidence intervals, providing statistical
support for the finding that incentives increased e↵ort.
D. Controlling for Demand
The nonparametric bounding approach described above yields bounds on treat-
ment e↵ects, but researchers may be interested in point estimates that “control
for” demand e↵ects. Intuitively, one might apply same-signed demand treatments
(positive-positive or negative-negative) to the treatment group and the control
group, with the goal of harmonizing demand between treatments. In this section
we describe how using this approach can eliminate bias if demand treatments are
assumed to be fully informative (pT = 1), and can reduce bias in other cases.
Derivations are given in web Appendix B.B8.19
We will assume throughout that Monotonicity holds strictly, i.e.   > 0 (  =
0 would imply no demand bias). The participant’s usual first-order condition,
with demand treatment hT and optimal action a⇤(⇣, hT ), is v1(a⇤(⇣, hT ), ⇣) +
 (⇣)E[h|hT , hL(⇣)] = 0. A first-order Taylor approximation around the natural
action a(⇣) yields:
a⇤(⇣, hT ) ⇡ a(⇣) +  (⇣)E[h|hT , hL(⇣)](8)
where  (⇣) ⌘   (⇣)/v11(a(⇣), ⇣) is a slope term capturing the e↵ect of beliefs on
actions, which we term “responsiveness.”   is positive as v11 < 0.
Assume two treatment groups, ⇣ 2 {0, 1}, with identical demand treatments
hT 2 { 1, 1, ;}, from which we estimate a treatment e↵ect a⇤(1, hT )  a⇤(0, hT ).
19We thank the editor, Stefano DellaVigna, as well as an anonymous referee for suggesting this line of
inquiry.
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Its bias relative to the true e↵ect can be decomposed as follows:
Bias = [a⇤(1, hT )  a⇤(0, hT )]  [a(1)  a(0)]
⇡  (1)  E[h|hT , hL(1)]  E[h|hT , hL(0)] | {z }
Bias due to beliefs
+( (1)   (0))E[h|hT , hL(0)]| {z }
Bias due to “responsiveness”
The first term captures di↵erences in beliefs between the treatment and control
environments, for example because they induce di↵erences in latent demand. The
second captures di↵erences in behavioral responsiveness, given beliefs, for example
because the treatment and control groups are at di↵erent locations on the cost of
e↵ort function.20
Fully informative demand treatments
Importantly, in the special case where researchers are willing to assume that
demand treatments are fully informative (pT = 1), we can eliminate the bias due
to beliefs: if hT is fully informative, E[h|hT , hL(1)] = E[h|hT , hL(0)] = 1 or  1.
We are left with the bias due to di↵erences in responsiveness. We can then ask
whether this bias is important, by testing for di↵erences in sensitivity between
treatment and control (an interaction e↵ect):21
[a⇤(1, 1)  a⇤(1, 1)]| {z }
Sensitivity (⇣ = 1)
  [a⇤(0, 1)  a⇤(0, 1)]| {z }
Sensitivity (⇣ = 0)
⇡ 2 ( (1)   (0)) .
If this term is small, we can obtain a point estimate of the demand-free treatment
e↵ect by comparing behavior on two same-signed demand treatment, essentially
we are “controlling for” the influence of demand.
If sensitivity di↵ers significantly between treatment and control, we can still
approximate the treatment e↵ect by averaging the estimates obtained with two
20In some settings it may be possible to sign the bias due to responsiveness. If demand treatments are
applied, and bounding holds, the sign of E[h|hT , hL(0)] is known and equal to the sign of hT . Knowledge
of the shape of v can then help us to sign  (1)    (0). For example in the real e↵ort case, we expect
responsiveness to decrease as e↵ort increases, due to the curvature of the cost of e↵ort function. That
implies  (1)  (0) < 0, in which case the bias due to responsiveness is negative when positive demand
treatments are used.
21Or, equivalently, testing whether the treatment e↵ect estimate di↵ers when two positive versus two
negative demand treatments are used.
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positive and two negative demand treatments:
0.5 ([a⇤(1, 1)  a⇤(0, 1)] + [a⇤(1, 1)  a⇤(0, 1)]) ⇡ a(1)  a(0).
This approach is equivalent to estimating the treatment e↵ect from the midpoints
of the bounds for the treatment and control groups. It relies on the symmetry of
the first-order Taylor approximation.
Less informative treatments
Alternatively, researchers might wish to use same-signed weaker demand treat-
ments to align beliefs among participants, without requiring pT = 1. In general
this will not eliminate bias entirely, but we can derive conditions under which
the bias will be reduced. Since di↵erences in responsiveness will no longer be
testable we focus on the prospect of reducing the bias due to beliefs, which will
be su cient if variation in responsiveness between treatments is small.22 We find
that when the latent demand biases have opposite signs (hL(1) =  hL(0), which
is the typical scenario that concerns researchers) our Bounding assumption is suf-
ficient for two same-signed demand treatments to reduce the bias due to beliefs.
When the latent demand biases have the same sign (hL(1) = hL(0)), same-signed
demand treatments that reinforce latent demand (i.e. hT = hL(1)) always reduce
bias. Su ciently strong opposite-signed treatments reduce bias, but Bounding is
not enough to guarantee this.
In summary, the Bounding assumption covers all cases except where the demand
e↵ects in treatment and control agree with one another and disagree with the
demand treatments used. To apply this approach, therefore, researchers may
need to use judgment about the likely sign of demand e↵ects in their experiment,
or report a range of estimates.
Applications
We apply the above-developed approaches to our e↵ort experiment in web Ap-
pendix Table A1. For the strong demand treatments, where we have argued
pT = 1 is not an unreasonable assumption, we see large and statistically signif-
icant di↵erences in sensitivity between the 0¢ and 1¢ treatment groups, so we
22In other words we ask when
  E[h|hT , hL(1)]  E[h|hT , hL(0)]   <   E[h|hL(1)]  E[h|hL(0)]  , for
hT 2 { 1, 1}.
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instead apply the “midpoint” technique. For the weak demand treatments we
report treatment e↵ect estimates for both positive-positive and negative-negative
demand treatment applications. Encouragingly, the estimates are all quite sim-
ilar to one another, lying within 10 percent of the conventional treatment e↵ect
estimate.
E. Structural estimates
Under further assumptions, strong demand treatments permit structural esti-
mation of demand-free model parameters (v), as well as   and E[h|hL]. Knowing
v allows the researcher to make predictions about behavior absent experimenter
demand. Knowing   allows them to quantify the importance of experimenter de-
mand. Measuring beliefs can enable them to diagnose and eliminate the sources of
latent demand e↵ects. We illustrate how structural estimation can be performed
using the real e↵ort experiment. Because our model simply nests that of DellaV-
igna and Pope (2018) (DP), we follow their approach to structural estimation.23
DP estimate the following utility function (expressed in our notation):
(9) v(a) = (s+ ⇣)a  c(a)
The action a is e↵ort, measured in points on the task, s is an intrinsic motivation
parameter (workers may exert e↵ort because they enjoy the task), and c(a) is a
cost of e↵ort function. We assume the environment enters v only via the piece
rate, so let ⇣ 2 {0, 1, 4} be a real number. DP solve the first order condition and
estimate the model parameters using nonlinear least squares (NLLS).24
Adding demand to this utility function gives:
(10) U(a, ⇣) = (s+ ⇣ +  (⇣)E[h|hT , hL(⇣)])a  c(a)
with corresponding first-order condition
(11) s+ ⇣ +  (⇣)E[h|hT , hL(⇣)]  c0(a⇤(⇣)) = 0
DP consider two alternative forms for c: First, a power function c(a) = ka1+ /(1+
 ), yielding optimal e↵ort equal to:
23We note that the structural analysis was not included in our pre-analysis plan.
24They also employ a minimum distance procedure. We stick to NLLS for brevity.
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(12) a⇤(⇣) =
✓
s+ ⇣ +  (⇣)E[h|hT , hL(⇣)]
k
◆ 1
 
Second, an exponential form c(a) = k exp( a)/ , with e↵ort level:
(13) a⇤(⇣) =
1
 
log
✓
s+ ⇣ +  (⇣)E[h|hT , hL(⇣)]
k
◆
We have seven treatment groups in total: neutral treatments with piece rates
equal to 0 cents, 1 cent, and 4 cents per 100 points on the task; and positive and
negative strong demand treatments in the 0 and 1 cent groups.25 Noting that
E[h|hL(⇣)] = pL(⇣)hL(⇣) 2 ( 1, 1), we can treat it as a single parameter whose
sign identifies hL and whose magnitude identifies pL(⇣). This leaves us with 10
parameters: s, k,  ,  (0),  (1),  (4), pL(0)hL(0), pL(1)hL(1), pL(4)hL(4), and
pT , so we need to impose some further restrictions.
First we assume that   is fixed:  (0) =  (1) =  (4) =  , eliminating two
parameters. In other words, varying incentives do not change the participants’
desire to please the experimenter. Second, as in the previous section, we assume
pT = 1, which implies that E[h|hT , hL] = hT . By assumption this is not justified
for our weak demand treatments, so we focus on the strong treatments. We are
left with seven parameters, s, k,  ,  , pL(0)hL(0), pL(1)hL(1), and pL(4)hL(4),
and are therefore exactly identified. We additionally estimate a specification in
which we restrict latent demand to depend only on whether monetary incentives
are present, i.e. pL(1)hL(1) = pL(4)hL(4).
While we use the same model as DP, identification comes from a di↵erent
source. Under the assumption of no latent demand (as in DP), s,  , and k
are identified from the three neutral treatment groups. When latent demand
is present, the model parameters (s,  , k,  ) are identified from the demand treat-
ment groups; with these in hand the neutral treatments allow us to back out the
beliefs pL(⇣)hL(⇣).
Full details of the estimation procedure, which follows DP, are provided in web
Appendix B.B9. We estimate equation (12) in logs and equation (13) in levels. Es-
25We also collected data using weak demand treatments, but we do not use it in this analysis a)
because it was collected in a separate experiment and b) because for estimation we need to impose the
parameter restriction pT = 1, which we do not believe is satisfied in the weak treatments.
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timation results are presented in Table 4. Columns 1–3 correspond to the power
cost function and columns 4–6 to the exponential cost function. In each case
we first mirror DP by estimating s,  , and k using only the neutral treatments,
assuming that there is no latent demand.26 Second, we include all treatment
groups and impose that latent demand depends only on whether monetary incen-
tives are present (pL(1)hL(1) = pL(4)hL(4)). Third, we allow latent demand to
di↵er across all three incentive levels. Coe cients s and   are measured in cents
per 100 points. Therefore, s = 1 is interpreted as intrinsic motivation playing an
equivalent role to an incentive of 1 cent per 100 points.
Our main finding is a nontrivial preference for pleasing the experimenter. Our
estimates of   take values in the range 0.2–0.3 and are similar across specifications.
A value of 0.2 implies that moving from complete uncertainty (E[h|hL] = 0) to
complete certainty that high e↵ort is desired (E[h|hL] = 1) increases e↵ort as
much as increasing the incentive by 0.2 cents per 100 points.
Our estimates of E[h|hL] are mostly negative, consistent with latent demand
decreasing e↵ort. However, the estimates are noisy and typically not significantly
di↵erent from zero. We estimate that in the 4 cent treatment, E[h|hL(4)] ⇡  6.5,
while the theory requires E[h|hL(4)] 2 ( 1, 1) (we note that the estimate is noisy
and  1 lies well within the 95 percent confidence interval). This most likely
reflects the fact that our demand treatments were only applied to the 0 and 1
cent treatment groups, so the e↵ort cost function must be extrapolated far out of
sample to estimate beliefs for the 4 cent group. We provide further discussion on
this point, and an illustrative figure, in web Appendix B.B9.
[Insert Table 4]
IV. Properties of demand e↵ects
In this section we examine some of the properties of demand e↵ects and the
assumptions underlying our approach. We begin with a discussion of Monotonic-
ity, examining whether it holds first on average and then at the individual level.
Second we turn to the central mechanism that drives behavior in the model:
changes in beliefs due signals about demand. Third, we consider the Bounding
assumption. Although we cannot test it directly (since natural actions are not
26There are some di↵erences between our parameter estimates and DP’s earlier work, which may
reflect changes in the participant pool over time.
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observed), we show that our bounds seem reasonable given existing evidence on
responsiveness to a particular design feature – anonymity in the dictator game –
that has been argued to potentially induce variation in demand. Fourth, we study
heterogeneity in sensitivity to our demand treatments, focusing on four dimen-
sions: incentives, gender, attention, and participant pool. These are cases where
we might expect our Monotone Sensitivity assumption to hold, such that vari-
ation in sensitivity is informative about underlying variation in latent demand.
Fifth, we examine the e↵ect of our demand treatments on the variance and full
distribution of actions.
A. Monotonicity
Monotonicity on average
Our first theoretical assumption is Monotonicity: a+(⇣)   aL(⇣)   a (⇣).
Panel C of Table 1 and Panel C of Table 2 examine this assumption for the
subset of tasks in which we collected data without applying demand treatments.27
We estimate the following equation using the incentivized MTurk respondents, in
which POSi andNEGi are dummy variables for the positive and negative demand
treatments, and the no-demand condition is the reference group:
ZYi = ⇡0 + ⇡1POSi + ⇡2NEGi + "i(14)
We find strong support for Monotonicity in average actions. The strong de-
mand treatments always moved average actions in the intended direction, and in
most cases the di↵erences are statistically significant. We find a significant nega-
tive response to negative weak demand in the investment game and a significant
positive response to weak positive demand in the dictator game. Responses to the
the positive demand treatment in the investment game and the negative demand
treatment in the dictator game have the wrong signs but are close to zero and
not statistically significant. Finally, our data from the representative sample is
fully consistent with Monotonicity for both the weak and strong treatments (see
Table C18).
27We have data for the dictator and investment games with weak and strong treatments, plus convex
time budgets and real e↵ort with only the strong treatments. Because the weak and strong treatments
were applied in separate experiments, we analyze the data separately.
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Testing monotonicity within-person
Our seventh experiment uses a within-participant design, collecting data on
behavior first without, and then with a demand treatment. This allows us to
examine Monotonicity directly at the individual level, and identify defiers, who
try to do the opposite of the experimenters wishes. Intuitively, by observing
who increases and who decreases their action in response to a positive demand
treatment, we can identify who is a complier and who is a defier. As discussed in
section I.D “too much” defiance can invalidate our bounds.
The design is as follows. MTurk participants were told that they would com-
plete two tasks, and be paid according one of them, selected by chance. Half
played the dictator game twice, and half the investment game twice. They first
completed the task without any demand treatment, then again with the addition
of a strong positive or negative demand treatment. We thus have four groups,
split by dictator/investment game and positive/negative demand.
The model implies a simple interpretation of the data. Participants observe
the first task, form a belief about h, and make a choice. They then observe the
second task with the demand treatment, update their belief, and make a new
choice. Strict compliers, with   > 0, will increase their action relative to task 1,
strict defiers with   < 0 will decrease it, and those with   = 0 should take the
same action in both tasks.28
Our main findings are captured by Figure 3, which plots actions from tasks 1
and 2. In the positive demand treatments, strict compliers lie above the 45 degree
line, strict defiers lie below and those who did not change their action lie on the
line. Only about 5 percent of our respondents are strict defiers. About 30 percent
do not change their behavior in response to our demand treatments, while the
remaining 65 percent strictly comply with our demand treatments (proportions
are similar across tasks). Thus we find very little evidence of defiance.
Table A2 presents mean actions and sensitivities estimated from the within
design and the equivalent objects from the earlier between-participants experi-
28The within design might fail to perfectly classify respondents, for two reasons. First, the theory
assumes that ⇣, and therefore the natural action, a(⇣), is independent of the demand treatment, hT .
This is a strong assumption in our within design, because it is clear that the response to hT is part of
the analysis, which could change participants’ interpretation of ⇣. However, if participants infer that our
interest is in showing people respond to our demand treatments, compliers would increase and defiers to
decrease their actions, in which case we would still arrive at the correct classification. Second, it might
matter that participants have made a prior choice, either out of a concern for consistency (reducing
responsiveness to our demand treatments) or a motive to conceal their defier/complier identity.
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ments. For the within experiment, “no demand” cells are computed from task
1, while demand treatment cells and sensitivities from task 2. The sensitivities
are quantitatively very similar in the between and within designs. This is en-
couraging, as it suggests researchers can simply and cheaply obtain bounds using
within-participant demand treatments, avoiding the need to recruit additional
participants to apply our method.
Within-participant data can be used to construct “defier-corrected” bounds.29
These, with confidence intervals, are displayed in Table A6. They are almost
identical to the conventional bounds, reflecting the low rate of defiance and giving
further comfort that defiance is quantitatively unimportant. Table A5 reports raw
actions separately for compliers and defiers.
B. Beliefs
The core mechanism in our model is that participants form beliefs about the
experimenter’s objective in response to implicit or explicit signals. We examine
this assumption with simple, unincentivized belief data collected after partici-
pants had completed their experimental task. The purpose of the measures was a
manipulation check, to ascertain that participants’ beliefs responded as expected
to the demand treatments. We asked two questions: “What do you think is the
result that the researchers of this study want to find?,” and “What do you think
was the hypothesis of this research study?” Responses were binary: participants
could respond that they thought the objective/hypothesis was either a high or
low action.30 We assume that participants report a high belief if their posterior
(E[h|hL] or E[h|hT , hL]) is positive, and a low belief if negative, so the average
response tells us the fraction of participants with high beliefs.
Results for incentivized MTurk respondents are presented in Tables A8–A9 in
the web Appendix. They confirm that our treatments moved average responses
in the anticipated direction. Overall, the levels of beliefs and magnitudes of shifts
in beliefs are similar for the strong and weak treatments, i.e. both were equally
successful in fixing the sign of beliefs. In the theory, strong and weak treatments
29For defiers, a(⇣) 2 [a+(⇣), a (⇣)] so, if the proportion of compliers is c the natural action lies in the
interval [cE[a (⇣)|    0] + (1  c)E[a+(⇣)|  < 0], cE[a+(⇣)|    0] + (1  c)E[a (⇣)|  < 0]]. In practice
one simply inverts the demand treatment variable for participants identified as defiers and computes
bounds as before. The construction of defier-corrected bounds was not included in our pre-analysis plan.
30One could collect richer belief measures and incentivize responses, but asking for fine-grained beliefs
about our own motivations seemed quite unnatural, particularly as there was no objective truth against
which to score. Our measures may of course be subject to their own demand bias.
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are equally e↵ective at fixing the sign of beliefs if pT   pL, but stronger treatments
lead to more extreme posteriors.31
C. Comparison of e↵ect sizes
Is the bounding assumption reasonable? Although it is not directly testable,
we compare our bounds to previous manipulations that have been hypothesized
to induce demand e↵ects. Our examples all come from the dictator game and
include four studies that varied participants’ degree of anonymity, and a study
in Sierra Leone that varied the presence of a white foreigner.32 We present e↵ect
sizes from these experiments and our own in Table A11.
Sensitivity to our weak treatments (a 17 percent reduction in giving under neg-
ative versus positive demand) is very close to the average e↵ect size across these
5 studies (around 21 percent reduction in giving in response to treatment), and
our strong treatments comfortably bound this average (a 42 percent reduction).
Considering individual studies, our weak bounds are close in magnitude to those
from Bolton, Katok and Zwick (1998), Barmettler, Fehr and Zehnder (2012), and
Cilliers, Dube and Siddiqi (2015), but smaller than those from Ho↵man et al.
(1994) and Ho↵man, McCabe and Smith (1996). These two studies in partic-
ular, however, have been criticized for inducing potentially strong experimenter
demand (Loewenstein, 1999), so may represent a scenario where the more conser-
vative strong bounds are preferable. Their e↵ect sizes are close to or a bit larger
than (and not significantly di↵erent from) our strong bounds.
The exercise is of course only suggestive, since responses in these studies include
direct e↵ects of anonymity on behavior as well as potential experimenter demand.
Additionally, the studies we consider were conducted in the laboratory and dif-
fer in various other ways from our online setting. The results are nevertheless
encouraging, in particular that our weak bounds seem to perform quite well.
31pT   pL also implies that all participants’ beliefs should have the “correct” sign following a demand
treatment. Not all of our participants reported correct beliefs following a demand treatment. This could
be due to measurement error in our belief data, or, as we discuss in Appendix B.B3, participants might
be inattentive to our demand treatments. If they are also inattentive to latent demand signals such
participants do not threaten Bounding.
32Ho↵man et al. (1994), Ho↵man, McCabe and Smith (1996), Bolton, Katok and Zwick (1998) and
Barmettler, Fehr and Zehnder (2012) study the e↵ect of “double blind” versus “single blind” anonymity
in dictator games, to our knowledge this is the complete set. Cilliers, Dube and Siddiqi (2015) study the
e↵ect of white foreigner presence.
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D. Heterogeneity
Does sensitivity to demand treatments vary by design and participant char-
acteristics? Here, we examine heterogeneous responses to our strong and weak
demand treatments on four pre-specified dimensions: by whether choices are in-
centivized or hypothetical; gender; attentiveness; and participant pool (MTurk
vs. representative online panel). Whether or not this heterogeneity can be inter-
preted as informative about di↵erences in underlying latent demand depends upon
whether Monotone Sensitivity holds for the environments under consideration, i.e.
whether they belong to the same comparison class. We show in Appendix B.B3
that variation in incentives, attention, and the preference for pleasing the exper-
imenter,   (which may di↵er by gender or participant pool), form valid bases for
comparison classes.
Incentivized vs. hypothetical choices
In MTurk experiments 1 and 2 we randomly assigned participants to make either
hypothetical or incentivized choices. In theory, we would expect higher sensitivity
in hypothetical choice, as the cost of deviating from the natural action is lower. To
test this prediction, we regress standardized actions on a dummy, POSi, taking
value one for the positive demand treatment and zero for the negative treatment;
a dummy indicating incentivized choice, Mi; and their interaction:
ZYi =  0 +  1POSi +  2Mi ⇥ POSi +  3Mi + "i(15)
Results for the weak and strong demand treatments are presented in Table 5.
Interestingly, participants making hypothetical or incentivized choices responded
very similarly to experimenter demand, in each task and on average, and if any-
thing sensitivity is slightly higher when incentivized.
Relatedly, we ask how sensitivity di↵ers when we increase performance pay in
the e↵ort task. Reasonable assumptions would imply sensitivity is decreasing in
performance pay (see web Appendix B.B3). Table 2 shows that sensitivity to our
strong treatments was around 3.5 times higher when e↵ort was unincentivized, as
predicted. We do not see the same pattern under the weak treatments, though
this may simply reflect the fact that sensitivity to these treatments was low.
The mixed evidence on responsiveness to incentives is somewhat surprising.
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One possibility is that our incentivized choices still involve relatively low stakes,
and that we would see a di↵erence at higher stakes. Additionally, the theory
allows   to depend upon ⇣ and another possibility is that raising the stakes also
raises participants’ desire to please the experimenter (e.g. due to reciprocity). We
see this as an interesting avenue for future work. Our results relate to previous
work examining the e↵ects of incentives on behavior in the lab (Camerer et al.,
1999).
Gender and attention
We measure self-reported gender in all tasks on MTurk and in the representative
panel, and attentiveness in all tasks except the e↵ort task (since DP did not
measure this variable). We define a participant as attentive if they passed an
attention screener at the beginning of the task.33 We estimate the following
equation:
(16) ZYi =  0 +  1POSi +  2Hi +  3Hi ⇥ POSi + "i
where Hi is the dimension of heterogeneity of interest.
As can be seen in Table 5, we find that women respond more strongly to the
strong demand treatments than men, with sensitivity around 0.15 standard devi-
ations higher, but no significant di↵erence for the weak treatments (where overall
sensitivity and thus statistical power is lower). We interpret the evidence as sug-
gestive of greater desire to please the experimenter among women, which relates
to the literature on gender di↵erences in preferences (Croson and Gneezy, 2009).
Turning to attention, only 10 percent of MTurk respondents failed our screener,
so we have little power to detect di↵erences in sensitivity. Table 5 shows higher
sensitivity (around 0.12 standard deviations) to our weak and strong manipula-
tions among attentive participants, but these e↵ects are not significant.34
33We use the screener developed by Berinsky, Margolis and Sances (2014). It presents participants
with a paragraph of text that appears to direct them to select their preferred online news sources from
a list, but concealed in the text is an instruction to instead choose two specific options. The assumption
is that attentive respondents read the question and follow the concealed instruction, while inattentive
respondents do not. Passing the attention check is weakly positively correlated with previous completion
of MTurk tasks, so we also consider heterogeneity using a representative online panel whose respondents
are generally less experienced and are unlikely to have seen the screener before. Moreover, there is little
variation in sensitivity by experience, results are available on request.
34Our pre-analysis plans specified that these heterogeneity tests would be conducted at the experiment
level, rather than averaged across all tasks within demand treatments. We perform these tests in web
Appendix C. Experiment 1 (strong treatments) finds higher sensitivity for women (p=0.10) and attentive
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In the representative online panel we find significantly higher sensitivity among
women, and among attentive participants (see web Appendix C.C4). Approxi-
mately 65 percent failed the screener, increasing our power here.
[Insert Table 5]
MTurk vs. representative online panel
Some researchers are concerned that MTurk workers are experienced research
participants and may behave di↵erently than a more representative participant
pool. In addition, MTurkers need to maintain a high work “acceptance” rating
and may therefore be especially motivated to please the researcher (Berinsky,
Huber and Lenz, 2012). To address such concerns, and to test an additional di-
mension of heterogeneity, we replicated the MTurk dictator game and investment
game experiments with respondents from a representative online panel, whose
participants are less experienced in the types of tasks we consider. We used both
weak and strong demand treatments, or no demand treatment. All choices were
incentivized at the same stakes as in the MTurk experiments.35 Table 5 tests for
di↵erences in sensitivity between MTurk and representative survey participants,
pooling tasks and for each task separately.36
Representative panel participants responded very similarly to MTurk partici-
pants, with sensitivity on average 0.03 standard deviations higher (not significant)
under both weak and strong treatments. There are some small di↵erences in sen-
sitivity to the strong treatments at the game level (significant at 10 percent for the
dictator game), but little evidence of systematic di↵erences between participant
pools.
participants (p=0.10). Experiment 2 (weak treatments)finds slightly higher sensitivity for men (p=0.25)
and attentive participants (p=0.53). Experiment 3 (e↵ort, strong treatments) finds almost identical
sensitivity for men and women (p=0.95).
35Respondents in the online panel were incentivized with $1 stakes in the panel currency, which they
can use to buy products in the survey provider’s online store. We discovered after the study that, while
some of the products in the store have a value equivalent to $1, others have lower value. This means that
the e↵ective stake size in the representative online panel may have been lower than on MTurk. Since we
find no di↵erences in response to demand treatments depending on whether choices are incentivized or
hypothetical on MTurk, we do not expect this to be an important concern.
36Our pre-analysis plan specified the test pooled across the strong and weak demand treatments - we
perform this test in web Appendix C.C4 and find no significant di↵erence.
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E. Demand and the distribution of actions
We have focused on analysis of mean behavior, but other moments may respond
to our demand treatments. For example, by aligning beliefs, they might reduce
the variance of observed actions. Table A12 shows that variance is very similar
and in most cases slightly lower under the demand treatments relative to no
demand. Figures A2 and A3 plot the cumulative distribution of actions for each
task and demand treatment, showing that the demand treatments shift the full
distribution of behavior. Encouragingly these shifts seem to almost always satisfy
first-order stochastic dominance, consistent with Monotonicity.
V. Using the method in practice
We now provide some practical guidance on using the methods developed in this
paper. First, we discuss settings in which demand treatments can be employed.
Second, many of the applications in this paper have been to “levels” of behavior, so
we list a few examples of other cases where one might be specifically interested in
bounding levels. Third, we summarize the set of techniques and recommendations
we have developed. Web Appendix B.B10 uses a diagram to work through an
example of each technique.
We have two main settings in mind for applications. First, demand treatments
can be applied in experiments in the laboratory, online, or in the field. We
expect their primary use will be for the various robustness checks and estimation
procedures we have outlined, but they can also be used for studying demand
e↵ects themselves. A natural next step in this agenda would be to compare
demand sensitivity in the lab and online, which may di↵er due to di↵erences
in attentiveness or social interaction with the experimenter. Second, they can
readily be applied in surveys. Our estimates from hypothetical dictator games,
convex time budgets and investment games, which are commonly used as survey
questions, show that reasonable bounds are obtained even when choices are not
incentivized. Applications include standalone surveys (e.g. on political views,
inflation expectations, labor market outcomes) or field experiments, which often
rely on survey data. For instance, participants might be told: “The researchers
expect respondents who received the intervention (e.g. cash, bednets, education)
to report more favorable outcomes.”
While the majority of experiments are aimed at estimating treatment e↵ects,
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researchers are often interested in mean responses in both surveys and experi-
ments, and might be concerned about robustness. We provide a few examples.
Policymakers might be intrinsically interested in levels of policy views about tax-
ation or immigration; beliefs about these objects; willingness to contribute to
public goods; inflation or growth expectations; consumption plans; or time use.
In the lab, we are often interested in the level of giving in dictator games; o↵ers
and frequency of rejections in ultimatum games; competitiveness of specific sub-
populations (e.g. men versus women); the amount of lying in coinflip games; or
the degree of risk or ambiguity aversion (e.g. for calibrating models).
A further use of levels estimated in the lab or surveys is to predict behavior
in other contexts (e.g. using risk, time or social preference measures to predict
real-world behaviors). The extent to which these measures are predictive may be
sensitive to demand e↵ects, which can be thought of as a form of measurement
error. Our approach can be used to shed light on how important such errors
might be. Within-subject applications even allow the researcher to measure and
control for participant-level estimates of demand sensitivity.
We make the following recommendations on how to use demand treatments.
First, in most studies we believe “weak” manipulations will give su ciently con-
servative bounds, because explicit signals about the study hypothesis are likely to
be more informative than implicit messages from the design in most cases. If po-
tential demand confounds are a first-order concern, researchers may find stronger
language, similar to our “strong” manipulations, helpful for further robustness.
Our phrasings were chosen for broad applicability, but researchers with a specific
application in mind may prefer to design their own demand treatments to best suit
their setting.37 With bounds in hand, researchers can compute demand-robust
confidence intervals following Imbens and Manski (2004).
Second, demand treatments can be applied within-participant by adding a small
number of questions or tasks to the end of a study. These are repetitions of ques-
tions or tasks presented earlier in the study, now including a demand treatment.
Our estimates suggest that this approach yields similar bounds to a between-
participant design, but is much less demanding of sample size. It also allows
researchers to identify which participants are most sensitive to demand, and com-
37When bounding treatment e↵ects, one could refer to the e↵ect of interest in the demand treatment.
For example, one could tell participants “You are in the high incentive treatment and will be compared
with a group that has low incentives. We expect that incentives will increase e↵ort.”
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pute “defier-corrected” bounds.
Third, we have shown how demand treatments can be used for point iden-
tification of treatment e↵ects, applying same-signed demand treatments to the
treatment and control group. If demand treatments are “su ciently informative”
this approach can eliminate biases due to di↵erences in beliefs, and any remain-
ing bias due to di↵erences in behavioral responsiveness can be tested for. We
have also shown how su ciently informative demand treatments can be used for
structural identification of models, by plausibly eliminating nuisance parameters
due to unobservable beliefs.
Fourth, in a study with many treatment arms, adding all of the possible de-
mand manipulations may become impractical. In such settings, researchers could
add demand manipulations to a subset of groups, and then compare treatment
e↵ect magnitudes to demand sensitivity measured in those groups. When an ex-
periment features many di↵erent and complicated choices, researchers may find it
worthwhile to consider what overarching beliefs could a↵ect their estimates (for
example, participants might believe that they should misreport their valuations in
willingness-to-pay elicitation), and target those with demand treatments, rather
than manipulating individual actions.
Finally, researchers conducting similar experiments to those in this paper may
find our estimates useful for benchmarking purposes.
VI. Conclusion
We propose a technique for assessing the robustness of experimental results to
demand e↵ects. We deliberately induce demand in a structured way to measure
its influence and to construct bounds on demand-free behavior and treatment
e↵ects. We formalize the intuition behind the procedure with a simple model in
which participants form beliefs about the experimental objective and gain utility
from conforming to it. Bounds are obtained by intentionally manipulating those
beliefs.
Across eleven canonical experimental tasks we find modest responses to demand
manipulations that explicitly signal the researcher’s hypothesis, with bounds aver-
aging around 0.13 standard deviations in width. We argue that these treatments
reasonably bound the magnitude of demand e↵ects in typical experiments, so our
findings give cause for optimism.
Using stronger manipulations we show how to obtain demand-robust point es-
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timates of treatment e↵ects, and analyze demand e↵ects structurally. In a real
e↵ort task with incentives of 1 cent per 100 “points,” we estimate a utility of
pleasing the experimenter of around 0.2 cents per 100 points. Combining demand
treatments with structural estimation can enable identification of preference pa-
rameters free of demand confounds.
Future work might employ similar treatments to study how to mitigate demand
in experiments, for example by examining how demand sensitivity varies with
features of the environment. One avenue for further exploration is the e↵ect of
incentives, given the central role they play in experiments.
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VII. Main Figures and Tables
Figure 1. Sensitivity to demand treatments, z-scored
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Note: This figure uses data from incentivized MTurk respondents with weak and strong demand treat-
ments. It presents the z-scored sensitivity of behavior to our demand treatments, i.e. the normalized
di↵erence in behavior between the positive and negative demand conditions. Error bars indicate 95
percent confidence intervals.
Figure 2. Bounding natural actions
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Note: This figure uses data from incentivized MTurk respondents with weak (W) and strong (S) demand
treatments. It displays mean responses by task and demand treatment. Upper (lower) points correspond
to positive (negative) demand treatments (a+ and a ), intermediate points to “no demand” treatments
(aL, not collected for all tasks). Lighter shaded sections indicate the response to positive and negative
demand treatments separately, dark shaded sections indicate sensitivity when aL was not measured.
Error bars indicate 95 percent confidence intervals.
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Figure 3. Measuring defiance through a within-participant design
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Note: This figure uses MTurk data from experiment 7 and displays the scatterplot of responses in task
1 (“no demand” condition) and task 2 (demand condition). Points above the 45-degree line indicate an
increase in the action, and points below the 45-degree line a decrease. The size of the rings is proportional
to the number of observations.
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Table 1—Response to weak demand treatments, all incentivized tasks
Time Risk Ambiguity E↵ort E↵ort Lying Dictator Ultimatum Ultimatum Trust Trust
Aversion 0 cent bonus 1 cent bonus Game Game 1 Game 2 Game 1 Game 2
Panel A: Unconditional Means
Positive demand 0.770 0.524 0.557 0.331 0.484 0.537 0.382 0.470 0.413 0.455 0.398
(0.027) (0.023) (0.024) (0.014) (0.012) (0.012) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.023) (0.017)
No demand 0.541 0.313
(0.021) (0.015)
Negative demand 0.766 0.472 0.499 0.343 0.469 0.530 0.318 0.443 0.362 0.430 0.348
(0.027) (0.021) (0.024) (0.014) (0.013) (0.011) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.025) (0.012)
Panel B: Sensitivity (positive - negative)
Raw data 0.005 0.052 0.058 -0.012 0.015 0.007 0.063 0.027 0.051 0.025 0.050
(0.038) (0.031) (0.034) (0.019) (0.018) (0.016) (0.020) (0.019) (0.019) (0.034) (0.021)
Z-score 0.012 0.156 0.174 -0.063 0.078 0.042 0.240 0.158 0.281 0.076 0.289
(0.096) (0.091) (0.102) (0.101) (0.094) (0.102) (0.075) (0.112) (0.102) (0.104) (0.125)
[0.096] [0.002]
Panel C: Monotonicity
Positive - Neutral (z-score) -0.051 0.261
(0.092) (0.078)
[0.237] [0.002]
Negative - Neutral (z-score) -0.207 0.021
(0.087) (0.078)
[0.056] [0.357]
Observations 422 739 390 388 381 412 758 360 411 352 346
Note: This table uses data from incentivized MTurk respondents with weak demand treatments. Panel A displays mean actions with standard errors in
the positive, negative and no-demand conditions respectively. Panel B presents the raw and z-scored sensitivity of behavior to our demand treatments.
Panel C displays the response to our positive and negative demand treatments separately, when “no demand” choices were also collected. Robust standard
errors are in parentheses. False-discovery rate adjusted p-values are in brackets, adjusting across tests within each task when testing the Monotonicity
assumption.
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Table 2—Response to strong demand treatments, all incentivized tasks
Time Risk Ambiguity E↵ort E↵ort Lying Dictator Ultimatum Ultimatum Trust Trust
Aversion 0 cent bonus 1 cent bonus Game Game 1 Game 2 Game 1 Game 2
Panel A: Unconditional Means
Positive demand 0.795 0.550 0.583 0.405 0.492 0.606 0.434 0.520 0.474 0.535 0.469
(0.024) (0.020) (0.024) (0.011) (0.011) (0.013) (0.015) (0.013) (0.014) (0.024) (0.017)
No demand 0.786 0.466 0.341 0.476 0.282
(0.025) (0.022) (0.012) (0.012) (0.015)
Negative demand 0.659 0.373 0.428 0.255 0.449 0.510 0.251 0.404 0.337 0.350 0.288
(0.028) (0.019) (0.023) (0.011) (0.011) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.022) (0.015)
Panel B: Sensitivity (positive - negative)
Raw data 0.137 0.177 0.155 0.150 0.043 0.096 0.183 0.116 0.136 0.185 0.181
(0.037) (0.027) (0.033) (0.016) (0.016) (0.019) (0.021) (0.018) (0.020) (0.032) (0.023)
Z-score 0.349 0.528 0.462 0.783 0.229 0.604 0.694 0.684 0.750 0.563 1.058
(0.095) (0.082) (0.098) (0.083) (0.084) (0.118) (0.080) (0.109) (0.111) (0.097) (0.133)
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.020] [0.001]
Panel C: Monotonicity
Positive - Neutral (z-score) 0.022 0.252 0.333 0.084 0.574
(0.088) (0.088) (0.085) (0.088) (0.082)
[0.363] [0.001] [0.001] [0.159] [0.001]
Negative - Neutral (z-score) -0.327 -0.276 -0.450 -0.145 -0.120
(0.097) (0.086) (0.085) (0.086) (0.080)
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.101] [0.046]
Observations 727 728 404 731 714 365 770 409 421 382 371
Note: This table uses data from incentivized MTurk respondents with strong demand treatments. Panel A displays mean actions with standard errors in
the positive, negative and no-demand conditions respectively. Panel B presents the raw and z-scored sensitivity of behavior to our demand treatments.
Panel C displays the response to our positive and negative demand treatments separately, when “no demand” choices were also collected. Robust standard
errors are in parentheses. False-discovery rate adjusted p-values are in brackets, adjusting across tests within each task when testing the Monotonicity
assumption.
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Table 3—Bounding Treatment Effects
Conventional Weak Bounds Strong Bounds
Treatment E↵ect Lower Upper Lower Upper
Count 540.720 530.001 588.270 177.421 948.978
(66.763) (64.532) (61.499) (62.379) (64.148)
Count (z-scored) 0.686 0.673 0.747 0.225 1.205
(0.085) (0.082) (0.078) (0.079) (0.081)
Note: This table uses data from the real e↵ort experiments with weak and strong demand treatments
(experiments 3 and 6). Column 1 shows conventional treatment e↵ect estimates. Columns 2 to 6 show
lower and upper bounds estimated using weak and strong treatments. We apply the “ironing” procedure
described in section III.B when constructing the weak estimates. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
“Count” is the raw score from the experiment, Count (z-scored) is standardized using the negative
demand condition, pooled across incentive treatment arms.
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Table 4—Structural Estimates
Power cost of e↵ort Exponential cost of e↵ort
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log Count Log Count Log Count Count Count Count
  0.175 0.249 0.205 0.300
(0.092) (0.095) (0.079) (0.066)
hL(0)pL(0) -0.735 -0.516 -0.525 -0.187
(0.172) (0.303) (0.191) (0.249)
hL(> 0)pL(> 0) -0.609 0.849
(2.194) (1.799)
hL(1)pL(1) -0.473 0.155
(1.110) (0.694)
hL(4)pL(4) -6.508 -6.600
(3.360) (1.963)
s 0.034 0.179 0.273 0.031 0.229 0.493
(0.051) (0.095) (0.126) (0.046) (0.096) (0.208)
k 4.7e-26 7.5e-24 6.5e-17 4.2e-08 2.1e-06 1.8e-04
(3.1e-25) (2.9e-23) (3.1e-16) (1.8e-07) (3.7e-06) (2.9e-04)
  7.260 6.583 4.433 6.5e-03 4.6e-03 2.3e-03
(2.216) (1.303) (1.707) (2.1e-03) (8.7e-04) (8.2e-04)
Observations 727 1691 1691 727 1691 1691
R-squared 0.122 0.166 0.166 0.167 0.204 0.206
Note: This table uses data from the the real e↵ort experiment on MTurk with strong demand treatments.
Coe cients s and   are measured in cents. s measures the respondents intrinsic motivation.   measures
the monetary value of acting according to the experimental objective.   is the e↵ort cost curvature and k
is the scaling parameter. hL(⇣)pL(⇣) is latent demand in incentive condition ⇣. hL(> 0)pL(> 0) is latent
demand in the combined 1-cent and 4-cent incentive conditions. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 5—Heterogeneity in response to weak and strong demand treatments (z-scored)
All Time Risk Ambiguity E↵ort E↵ort Lying Dictator Ultimatum Ultimatum Trust Trust
Games Aversion 0 cent bonus 1 cent bonus Game Game 1 Game 2 Game 1 Game 2
Panel A: Weak - Design Characteristics
Sensitivity ⇥ Incentive 0.073 0.149 -0.002
(0.085) (0.125) (0.115)
Observations 1963 970 993
Panel B: Weak - Respondent Characteristics
Sensitivity ⇥ Male 0.038 -0.028 0.057 0.069 0.305 0.033 0.060 0.029 -0.089 0.003 0.257 -0.239
(0.061) (0.174) (0.179) (0.203) (0.239) (0.236) (0.189) (0.146) (0.192) (0.185) (0.230) (0.229)
Observations 4450 422 473 390 388 381 412 515 360 411 352 346
Sensitivity ⇥ Attention 0.119 -0.402 -0.077 0.434 0.226 0.585 0.094 0.368 0.116 -0.398
(0.116) (0.395) (0.307) (0.504) (0.305) (0.328) (0.296) (0.230) (0.362) (0.301)
Observations 3681 422 473 390 412 515 360 411 352 346
Sensitivity ⇥ Representative sample 0.032 0.032 0.032
(0.084) (0.127) (0.110)
Observations 2125 1041 1084
Panel C: Strong - Design Characteristics
Sensitivity ⇥ Incentive -0.007 -0.063 0.196 0.072
(0.080) (0.132) (0.116) (0.121)
Observations 2989 994 996 999
Panel D: Strong - Respondent Characteristics
Sensitivity ⇥ Male -0.152 -0.212 -0.090 -0.382 0.075 0.005 -0.223 -0.201 -0.137 -0.144 0.098 -0.361
(0.064) (0.168) (0.160) (0.192) (0.197) (0.214) (0.217) (0.153) (0.187) (0.201) (0.216) (0.240)
Observations 4800 491 482 404 492 472 365 511 409 421 382 371
Sensitivity ⇥ Attention 0.117 0.319 0.471 -0.276 0.255 -0.024 -0.272 0.229 0.918 -0.091
(0.140) (0.393) (0.401) (0.414) (0.358) (0.530) (0.394) (0.538) (0.409) (0.311)
Observations 3836 491 482 404 365 511 409 421 382 371
Sensitivity ⇥ Representative sample 0.027 -0.121 0.176
(0.081) (0.118) (0.112)
Observations 2184 1070 1114
Note: Outcome variables are z-scored at the task level. Panels A and C display heterogeneous treatment e↵ects by design characteristics, i.e. whether
choices are incentivized or hypothetical. Panels B and D display heterogeneous treatment e↵ects by respondent characteristics: gender, attention and
population. “Male” equals one for males, “attention” equals one if the respondent passed the attention screener, “representative sample” equals one for
representative sample respondents.
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Table 6—Overview of Experiments
Experiment Sample Tasks Demand Treatments Real or Hypothetical
Experiment 1 (May
18, 2016 - May 30,
2016)
MTurk
(N=4,479)
Dictator Game, Investment
Game and Convex Time
Budgets
Strong positive demand,
strong negative demand
and no-demand treatment
Both real stakes and hy-
pothetical choices
Experiment 2 (July
5, 2016 - July 25,
2016)
MTurk
(N=2,950)
Dictator Game and Invest-
ment Game
Weak positive demand,
weak negative demand and
no-demand treatment
Both real stakes and hy-
pothetical choices
Experiment 3 (Aug
26, 2016 - Aug 27,
2016)
MTurk
(N=1,691)
E↵ort experiment with 1
cent bonus and E↵ort ex-
periment with no bonus.
Also e↵ort experiment with
4 cent bonus (no demand
treatments were applied to
this group).
Strong positive, strong
negative and no-demand
treatment
Real stakes (real e↵ort
experiment)
Experiment 4 (Aug
18, 2016 - Sep 1,
2016 7)
Research Now
Representative
online Panel
(N= 2,933)
Dictator Game and Invest-
ment Game
Strong positive demand,
strong negative demand,
weak positive demand and
weak negative demand and
no-demand treatment
Real stakes
Experiment 5 (Sep,
12, 2016 - Sep 20,
2016)
MTurk (N=
5,045)
Trust game (first and sec-
ond mover), Ultimatum
game (first and second
mover), Lying game, Am-
biguous Investment Game
and Convex Time Budgets
Strong positive demand,
strong negative demand,
weak positive demand and
weak negative demand
Real stakes
Experiment 6 (Sep,
19, 2016 - Sep 20,
2016)
MTurk
(N=769)
E↵ort experiment with 1
cent bonus, E↵ort experi-
ment with no bonus
Weak positive demand and
weak negative demand
Real stakes (real e↵ort
experiment)
Experiment 7 (May
18, 2017 - May 20,
2017)
MTurk
(N=999)
Dictator Game and Invest-
ment Game
Within design: Task 1: no
demand treatment; task 2:
strong positive demand or
strong negative demand
Real stakes
Note: This table summarizes the key design features of each of the experiments. In experiment 5 for
convex time budgets we only employ the weak demand treatments, while for all other tasks in experiment
5 we employ both strong and weak demand treatments.
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Table 7—Details of Experimental Tasks
Task Description Sample Show
up
fee
Action space Payo↵s Strong Demand Treatment:
“You will do us a favor if
you. . . ”
Weak Demand Treatment:
“We expect that participants who
are shown these instructions will. . . ”
Dictator
Game
Choose to split money
between yourself and
another participant.
Strong: MTurk between (N=1,503);
MTurk within (998); Rep. Sample
(N=899). Weak: MTurk between
(N=1,477); Rep. Sample (N=865).
$.25 a 2 [0, 1] is frac-
tion of $1 sent to the
other participant.
Amount not sent (1  a). “. . . give more (less) to the other
participant than you normally
would.”
“. . . give more (less) to the other par-
ticipant than they normally would.”
Investment
Game
Choose how much to in-
vest in a risky project.
Strong: MTurk between (N=1,492);
MTurk within (1000); Rep Sample
(N=902). Weak: MTurk between
(N=1,473); Rep. Sample (N=883).
$.25 a 2 [0, 1] is fraction
of $1 invested
$(1 a)+3a with probabil-
ity 0.4, $(1  a) otherwise.
“. . . invest more (less) than you
normally would.”
“. . . invest more (less) than they nor-
mally would.”
Ambiguous
Investment
Game
Choose to how much to
invest in an uncertain
project.
Strong: MTurk (N= 404). Weak:
MTurk (N= 390).
$.25 a 2 [0, 1] is fraction
of $1 invested
$(1  a) + 3a with unstated
probability, $(1   a) other-
wise.
“. . . invest more (less) than you
normally would.”
“. . . invest more (less) than they nor-
mally would.”
Convex
Time Bud-
gets
Choose between receiv-
ing money today vs.
money in seven days.
Strong: MTurk (N=1,484); Rep.
Sample (N=899). Weak: MTurk
(N=422).
$.25 a 2 [0, 1.2] is the
amount to be re-
ceived in 7 days
$(1   a)/1.2 is received
within 24 hours, and $a is
received in 7 days.
“. . . choose to receive more
(less) in seven days than you
normally would.”
“. . . choose to receive more (less)
in seven days than they normally
would.”
E↵ort: No
bonus
Alternately press the a
and b button without
receiving any bonus.
Strong: MTurk (N=731). Weak:
MTurk (N=388).
$1 a 2 [0, 4000] is num-
ber of a-b button
presses
No payo↵s beyond show-up
fee
“. . . work harder (less hard)
than you normally would.”
“. . . work harder (less hard) than
they normally would.”
E↵ort: 1-
cent bonus
Alternately press the a
and b button, receiving
1 cent per 100 points.
Strong: MTurk (N=714). Weak:
MTurk (N=381).
$1 a 2 [0, 4000] is num-
ber of a-b button
presses
1 cent per 100 button
presses.
“. . . work harder (less hard)
than you normally would.”
“. . . work harder (less hard) than
they normally would.”
Trust Game
1st mover
Choose to send an
amount of money to the
other player.
Strong: MTurk (N=382). Weak:
MTurk (N=352).
$.25 a 2 [0, .2, .4, .6, .8, 1]
is fraction of $1 sent
$2a is sent to second mover,
who decides how much to
send back. $(1 a) not sent
is kept with certainty.
“. . . send more (less) to the
other participant than you nor-
mally would.”
“. . . send more (less) to the other
participant than they normally
would.”
Trust Game
2nd mover
Choose to send back
some money to the
other player. (Strategy
method)
Strong: MTurk (N=371). Weak:
MTurk (N=346).
$.25 a 2 [0, 1.2] is amount
returned, averaged
over each possible
nonzero amount
received.
Amount not sent back. “. . . send back more (less) to the
other participant than you nor-
mally would.”
“. . . send back more (less) to the
other participant than they normally
would.”
Ultimatum
Game 1st
mover
O↵er a split to the other
player.
Strong: MTurk (N=409). Weak:
MTurk (N=360).
$.25 a 2 [0, 1] is o↵er to
the other player
1 a if the o↵er is accepted,
0 if it is rejected.
“. . . o↵er more (less) to the
other participant than you nor-
mally would.”
“. . . o↵er more (less) to the other
participant than they normally
would.”
Ultimatum
Game 2nd
mover
Specify the smallest of-
fer you would accept.
Strong: MTurk (N=421). Weak:
MTurk (N=411).
$.25 a 2 [0, 1] is min. ac-
ceptable o↵er: reject
all o↵ers below this
amount.
Amount received if it ex-
ceeds a, otherwise zero.
“. . . require a higher (lower)
minimum amount than you nor-
mally would.”
“. . . require a higher (lower) mini-
mum amount than they normally
would.”
Lying Report the number of
“Heads” in 10 coinflips.
Strong: MTurk (N=365). Weak:
MTurk (N=412).
$.25 a 2 [0, 1, . . . , 10] is
number of heads.
10 cents per “Heads” re-
ported: $0.1a.
“. . . report more (fewer) heads
than you normally would.”
“. . . report more (fewer) heads than
they normally would.”
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